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despaired_despaired是什么意思

精神,身体,笛卡尔despaired_despaired是什么意思

发布时间：2019-02-08加入收藏来源：互联网点击：

Dualist Theories. Be that as it may, the World-knot may be a tangle less because the components themselves are mental and physical than because each of them was defined from the beginning as a distinct substance. “Substance” is a term hardly used in technical philosophy today. It belongs to a family of largely abandoned concepts. But it was very vital in Descartes’ time, and certain features lingered on to complicate philosophy when the central concept had all but disappeared. Substances were by definition independent of one another in such a way that any causal interaction between them was impossible. Nevertheless, bodies and minds appear to interact: my arm normally moves when I want it to, I feel pain when I touch a hot trying pan.

二元论理论。尽管这样，由于它们自身的组成是精神与物理的，而不是由于它们中每一个从开始就被定义成的一种独特实质，因此世界结也许没有那么纠结。在当今的技术哲学中已几乎不再使用“实质”这一术语。在很大程度上，它属于一个已被抛弃的概念家族。但在笛卡尔的时代它是非常重要的，而且在中心概念几乎消失时，某些特征仍纠缠着复杂的哲学。按照定义，实质是相互独立的，这样，在它们之间任何因果关系的相互作用都是不可能的。然而，身体与精神似乎是相互作用的：我的手臂在我想让它活动时通常就会活动，当我触摸到热锅时我会感觉到疼痛。

These intuitions appear to support the theory of interactionism, but that theory is ruled out conceptually in that bodies and minds are distinct substances. Where it not for the concept of substance, there would be no problem, and as it is there can be no solution. Certainly it would not be helpful to insist, with epiphenomenalism, or “one-way interactionism,” that bodies can act on minds but minds cannot act on anything. For apart from raising the question of why minds should be causally impotent, epiphenomenalism appears only to have revised the rules of meaning for “substance.”

这些直觉似乎支持相互作用论的理念，但该理论在概念上排除了身体与精神是独特的实质。假如不是实质的概念，就不存在问题，而现在的情况是不可能有解决的办法。运用副现象论或者“单向相互作用论”来坚持身体可以作用于精神，而精神无法作用于任何事情的观点，当然不会有任何帮助。因为，除了提出为什么精神应该是因果的无效问题之外，副现象论似乎只是修正了“实质”含义的规则。

There is left only one possible theory, namely parallelism, according to which mental and bodily events form parallel series with no events in common. That leaves the intuitions to be accounted for, which would seem to favor interactionism. A number of quite ingenious solutions were advanced in the 17th century, most of which relegated to God the task of mediating between the two series. It is a standing miracle, and evidence of constant divine intervention, that a person’s arm should go up when he want it to. God causes the idea of warmth to form in a person when his body is close to the fire, and so on. This position is occasionalism, as defended by Arnold Guelincx and Nicholas de Malbranche, who used a rhetorical image for representing the two series. They are like two clocks, one of which strikes the hour when the other marks it, not because there is any causal interaction between the clocks but because they were designed to function in phase.

只剩下了一个可能的理论，即平行论，据此，精神的与身体的活动形成了没有任何共有活动的平行系列。这就留下了需要解释的直觉问题，它似乎有利于相互作用论。在17世纪出现了许多很巧妙的解决方案，其中大部分都将调停这两个系列的任务委托给了上帝。这是一个永恒的奇迹，而且是神圣不断干预的证据，因为人的手臂在神想要它活动时就会举起。当一个人的身体接近火时，诸如此类，是上帝使人形成了温暖的念头。这一观点就是偶因论，是由阿诺德·奎林克斯和尼古拉斯·德·马尔布兰奇辩护的，他们用了一种夸张的意象来表现这两个系列。他们就像两座时钟，一个时钟报时，另一个也跟着报时，这并不是因为在两个时钟之间存在什么因果关系的相互作用，而是因为它们被设计成了相同的功能。

G. W. Leibniz exhaustively elaborated on occasionalism, but it and all the classical positions mentioned simply vanish when substance is given up as a relevant concept. When it goes, all that remains is to note that arms move when men want them to, and so on, and that the constant conjunction of volition and movement is like any causal connection to be found anywhere in nature. The relationship between mind and body, or between mental and bodily events, is no more (though certainly no less) difficult to analyze than any causal connection. John Locke and David Hume made an effort to discover the laws by which mental events are related to one another, on the assumption that such laws are similar to the law of physics.

G. W. 莱布尼兹详尽地阐述过偶因论，但当实质作为相关的概念被放弃时，偶因论和所有提到的古典观点都消失了。当它消失时，剩下的一切就是当人想让手臂移动时，注意手臂的移动等等，以及意志和运动的不断结合，就像在自然中发现的任何因果关系那样。在精神与身体之间，或者在精神的与身体的活动之间的关系，并不比任何因果关系分析起来更加困难（尽管肯定不少）。约翰·洛克和大卫·休谟在假定这些规律与物理定律相似的情况下，为发现心理活动之间相互关联的规律做出了努力。

Monist Theories. Even to speak of causal relations between two kinds of events, mental and physical, may be regarded as implying a metaphysical stand at the outset. For philosophers known as monists have often insisted that there is only one kind of event because there is only one kind of thing out of which the universe in made. This one thing may be mental, in which case the position is idealism. It may be material, in which case the position is materialism. Or it may be neutral as to the distinction between mental and material, a view known as neutral monism and vigorously defended by William James. Each of these positions has the complex task of showing how the obvious distinctions between mental and material are to be explained.

一元论者的理论。甚至值得一提的是，在精神与物理两种活动之间的因果关系可被视为在一开始就隐含着形而上学的立场。因为被称为一元论者的哲学家通常坚持认为只有一种结果，因为只有一种情况创造了宇宙。这一东西可能是精神上的，在这种情况下，立场就是唯心主义。这一东西可能是物质的，在这种情况下，立场就是唯物主义。至于精神与物质的区别它可能是中立的，一种被认为是中立一元论的观点，而且威廉·詹姆斯对此进行了有力的辩护。这些观点中的每一种观点都有复杂的任务，就是展示出如何解释精神与物质之间明显的区别。

Currently the most actively discussed position is a form of materialism known as central-state identity theory, according to which mental states are simply identical with certain states of the brain or of the central nervous system. They are identical in the way in which a stroke of lightning is identical with a shower of electrons. In part this theory is subject to scientific confirmation, but in part it is more than a scientific itself encapsulates virtually every philosophical problem there is. To the degree that mental states are intensional, however, then so must brain-states be intensional, since mind and brain are one.

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