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despaired_despaired是什么意思

精神,身体,笛卡尔despaired_despaired是什么意思

发布时间：2019-02-08加入收藏来源：互联网点击：

作为标准的内涵。在与身体状态形成的对照中，一个更有前途的精神标准就是心理的状态，它们都是内涵的---就是说，它们总是有“对象”，所以它们总是 “…的”或“关于”某事的。如果是真的，那么这种观察在心理学的描述之间就蕴含了逻辑上的差异，就是内涵的，而非心理学的（物理的）描述，就是外延的。当一个句子中出现的任何术语可由另一个术语替代而不改变该句子的真值，如果两个术语代表了同样的东西时，那么它就是外延的。这并不是一个外延的句子。因此，即使“晨星”与“暮星”代表了同一个事物（行星维纳斯），它不可能因为史密斯相信晨星是一颗星，他就会相信暮星也是一颗星。因为，他可能认为木星是颗行星，而不知道它与晨星是一样的。

There are further differences between intensional and extensional descriptions. The objects of mental states need not exist---that is, one can fear, or hate, or believe in something that is not real. So it will not follow that because Smith believes in elves, elves in fact exist. In extensional description, by contrast, it is always valid to infer from the truth of the sentence “a is F” that something is F. If the sentences and descriptions of psychology then refer to mental states, and if the latter are indeed intensional, then the descriptions of psychology will have special logical features differentiating them from physical, or extensional, descriptions. Then the efforts to define such concepts as “belief” in term of dispositions to behave, or to respond in certain ways, would be doomed, since these descriptions are extensional.

在内涵与外延的描述之间还存在进一步的差别。精神状态的对象不一定存在---换句话说，人可能恐惧，或者憎恨，或者相信不存在的东西。因此，事情不会因为史密斯相信精灵的存在，精灵在事实上就存在。在外延的描述中，相比之下，从“小写的a 是大写的F”中推导出某物是大写F这句话的真实，总是有效的。如果这句话对心理学的描述指的是精神状态，而且如果后者确实是内涵的，那么心理学的描述就会有别于物理的，或外延描述的特殊逻辑特征。那么根据行为倾向，或者以某种方式的回应将这样的概念定义为“信念”的种种努力就注定要失败，因为这些描述都是外延的。

This argument may furnish cognitive psychology with the basis for a critique of behaviorism, which can be brought out by considering under what conditions a piece of behavior is an action. It is an action when it is explained through the agent’s reasons. Whatever may be the connection between reasons and conduct—for example, whether the connection is causal—reasons, when they explain conduct, are themselves intensional. And while the behaviorist may say that the concept of action is one his program means to replace, “replacement” is itself a kind of action, so that if the behaviorist can have reason for doing things, so might his subject. And if psychology itself is intensional, it is unclear that intensionality can be eliminated without eliminating psychology. In any event, intensionality seems a better basis for asserting the autonomy of psychology than conditioning is.

这一论据可以为行为主义的批判提供认知心理学的基础，它能通过判断得出在什么条件下一种举止成为一种行为。当通过中介的原因获得解释时它就是一种行为。无论在原因与行为之间有什么联系----例如，联系是否是因果关系---原因，当它们解释了行为时，它们自身就是内涵的。虽然行为主义者会说，行为概念是人计划的替代手段，“替代”本身就是一种行为，因此，如果行为主义者能够有理由去做一些事情，那么他的主体也能这么做。而且如果心理学本身是内涵的，那么在没有排除心理学的情况下，能否排除内涵尚不清楚。不管怎样，相比条件作用，内涵对于主张心理学的自主似乎有更好的基础。

Representation as a Criterion. It can be argued that not everything mental is intensional (Pain and other sensations may not be) and that not everything intensional is a mental state (pictures are always ”of” something). But even if they are not the criterion for the mental, the fact that mental states are intensional at all must say something important about the mind. No issue in contemporary philosophy is more complex than the analysis of intensionality.

作为标准的再现。也许有人会说，不是所有的精神活动都是内涵的（痛苦以及其它的感觉可能就不是），并不是所有的内涵都是一种精神状态（图片总是有关某事的）。但即使它们不是精神的标准，但精神状态是内涵的事实完全应该说明了精神状态某些重要的事情。当代哲学中的问题没有比对内涵的分析更复杂了。

But it has been argued that intensionality would have natural explanation if mental states were representations of the world, inasmuch as the logical features to which intensionality gives rise are typically found in descriptions of representations—for example, descriptions of sentences, pictures, and the like. And this would suggest that explanation in psychology would make an essential reference to the way the subject represented his world.

不过有人认为，如果精神状态是世界的再现，那么内涵就会具有自然的解释能力，因为通常在再现的描述中可以找到内涵引起的逻辑特征---例如，对句子、图片等等的描述。这表明，心理学的解释会对主体代表其世界的方式做出重要的参考。

With this suggestion, however, the intensional analysis of mind connects with the explanatory role we noticed in connection with “thought”; for, explaining a man’s actions with reference to his thinking is pretty much to say that we have to take account of how he represent his situation. But representation, finally, cannot be very far from what Descartes thought minds were: he believed that the task of a res cogitans is to arrive at a true representation of the world. His life as a scientist was to find this representation, and his life as a philosopher was to convince himself of its certainty.

然而，伴随这种意见，对精神的内涵分析就与我们注重的有关“思想”的解释作用相关联；因为，参考其想法来解释一个人的行为差不多是说，我们不得不考虑他是如何描述其处境的。但再现，最终不会与笛卡尔认为的心灵很远：他认为，思维实体的任务是对世界的一种真实再现。他作为科学家的一生就是寻找这一再现，而他作为哲学家的一生就是使他自己相信其必然。

METAPHYSICAL APPROACHES

We have thus far examined the mind-body problem from the perspective of philosophical psychology. But the problem has traditionally been viewed as a metaphysical one, and indeed as the basic metaphysical problem, for the joining of mind and body---or of consciousness and its objects—was epitomized by Arthur Schopenhauer as the World-knot. It is a knot so densely inter-looped that philosophers have of often despaired of unraveling it and have sought instead to cut through it by insisting that the entire issue is nonsense of some deep sort.

形而上学的方法

截止目前，我们已从哲学心理学的视角审视了精神-身体的问题。但在传统上该问题一直被看作一个形而上学的问题，为了精神与身体的结合，甚至被看成一个基本的形而上学问题，或者由阿瑟·叔本华概括为世界结---意识与其对象的问题。那是一个如此密集的相互交织的结，以至于哲学家常常对解开它感到绝望，而坚持认为整个问题都是无稽之谈来避开它。

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