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despaired_despaired是什么意思

精神,身体,笛卡尔despaired_despaired是什么意思

发布时间：2019-02-08加入收藏来源：互联网点击：

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MIND is a philosophical concept normally contrasted with the concept of body. Both concepts have acquired their meanings through so long-standing a set of metaphysical disagreements that neither can be defined in isolation from the controversial theories in which each is historically embedded. Most modern theories of mind and body are responses to distinctions laid down in the 17th century by Rene Descartes, who supposed the universe to be divided between two fundamental and irreducible sorts of substances, roughly corresponding to minds and bodies. These substances may be considered from a psychological perspective concerned with how the minds works or a metaphysical perspective concerned with its nature.

精神是个哲学概念，通常与身体的概念形成对照。两个概念通过一系列存在已久的形而上学的分歧获得了它们各自的含义，以至于两者都无法从历史发展而来的这些有争议的理论中孤立地来定义。大多数精神与身体的现代理论都是对勒奈·笛卡尔于17世纪提出的种种差别的回应，笛卡尔认为，宇宙被分为了两种根本的和不可削减的物质，大致对应于精神和身体。这些物质可从心理学的角度来考虑精神是如何运作的，或者从形而上学的角度来考虑它的质。

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Thought as a Criterion of Mind. Descartes claimed that thought was the essential property of mind which he appropriately termed res cogitans, or “thinking thing.” The essential properties of a thing are those it cannot coherently be conceived of as lacking. Descartes could not think of himself as lacking thought, since in the very effort to do so he must be thinking. But he could, he claimed, coherently conceive of himself as lacking a body, since he might only be dreaming that he had one. Hence, having a body occupying space—that is, a res extensas, or “extended thing”—is not essential to a thinking thing. In his view, bodies and minds are fundamentally different: bodies cannot think, and minds are un-extended in space. Since each can be conceived of as logically independent of the other, the mind can in principle survive the death of the body. While this conclusion is no proof of immortality, the hope of such a proof was never far from Descartes’ intentions, which shows that his concept of mind inherited certain features of the Christian concept of soul. But the logical separation of bodies from minds—or souls—immediately gives rise to problems. One is that the use of the concept of thought can be immediately considered as irrelevant to the understanding of bodily behavior.

心理学的方法

作为精神标准的思想。笛卡认为，思想是精神的本质属，他恰当地将其称为思维实体，或“思想物”。一个事物的本质属是那些被认为是相互偶合的不可缺乏的属。笛卡尔不可能认为他自己缺乏思想，因为在这种努力中他一定在思考。但他声称，他可以连贯地想象他自己没有身体，因为他可能只是在做梦他拥有一个身体。因此，拥有一个占据空间的身体---换言之，是一个延伸，或者“延伸的事物”---对一种思考的事物并不是必不可少的。在他看来，身体和精神从根本上是不同的：身体不能思考，而精神是无法在空间中延伸的。因为，在逻辑上各自都可被构想成对彼此的独立，原则上精神在身体亡后可以继续存在。虽然这个结论并不是永生的证据，但对这种证据的希望从未远离笛卡尔的意图，它表明他的精神概念继承了基督教灵魂概念的某种特征。不过是身体从精神---或者灵魂符合逻辑的分离---于是立刻引发了种种问题。问题之一就是使用思想的概念会立刻被认为与对身体行为的理解无关。

We often refer to thought in explaining someone’s conduct—for example, a man’s digging is explained by reference to his thinking that there is gold in the ground. We also say that a dog is digging because he thinks there is a bone. Theologians would be reluctant to attribute souls to animals, and Descartes hesitated even to allow them minds. This means that however similar to human conduct animal behavior is, it must be possible to explain the latter without reference to mind or thought. But because the similarities are so great, the question arises as to whether we need to refer to thought at all in explaining human conduct. This problem was rendered acute through Descartes’ concession that what he believed to be other men acting as they do might not be men at all but cleverly designed automata. Moreover, he reasoned, since my own body is distinct from my mind, perhaps all bodily conduct can be explained through the same mechanical principles that cover animals or machines.

我们在解释某人的行为时常常涉及思想---例如，一个人的挖掘可参照他认为地下有金子来解释。我们也可以说一只狗在挖掘，因为它认为那里有骨头。神学家不愿意把灵魂归于动物，而笛卡尔甚至不允许它们拥有精神。这意味着无论人类的行为举止与动物的行为多么相似，在不涉及精神或思想的情况下，解释后者的行为是完全可能的。但由于这种相似是如此之高，出现的问题就是，在解释人类行为时究竟我们是否需要涉及到思想。通过笛卡尔的让步，尖锐地提出了这一问题，以至于他认为其他人类做出的行为根本不可能是人类的行为，而是设计巧妙的自动装置。而且他推断，由于我自己的身体与我的精神是全然不同的，也许所有的身体行为都可以通过包括动物或机器相同的机械原理来解释。

These considerations immediately deprive the concept of thought of its common explanatory role, a consequence Descartes evidently was prepared to accept. So was Benedict de Spinoza, who argued that the belief that we cannot explain bodily behavior purely in bodily terms is simply owing to the fact that we do not yet know enough about bodies. This conjecture is strikingly confirmed by modern servomechanisms, machines to which we would be reluctant to ascribe minds, much less souls, but whose computational powers resemble and amplify human ones. Machines of this sort are different, no doubt, from bodies as conceived of by Descartes. But because our knowledge of electric circuit appears sufficient to account for the behavior of machines, reference to mind and to thought appear decreasingly relevant to our understanding the physical universe, including the human body.

这些考虑直接使思想的概念丧失了它常见的解释作用，而笛卡尔显然是准备接受这一结果的。本尼迪克特·德·斯宾诺沙也是如此，他认为，我们无法纯粹用身体的术语来解释身体行为的信念，仅仅是由于事实上我们对身体尚未足够的了解。这一推测被现代的自动控制装置惊人地确认了，那是我们不愿意归因于精神的，更不要说归因于灵魂的机器，但那些机器的计算能力类似和增强了人类的能力。毫无疑问，这类机器与笛卡尔设想的身体是不同的。但由于我们对电路的了解似乎足以解释机器的行为，因此关于精神和思想，似乎与我们对物质世界的理解，包括人类的身体愈发地缺乏了相关。

Behaviorist View. This seeming irrelevance of thought is reinforced by the claims, and in some measure by the results, of behaviorist psychology, which allegedly eliminates all mentalistic explanation in favor of descriptions of differential responses to stimuli. Even verbal behavior is said to require nothing save an appropriate history of conditioning.

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